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Abstract 
With EU enlargement, peculiar Central European ideas and traditions of integration 
emerged in European politics. In the discussions on a European constitution, the 
representatives of the new member states surprised the “old” Europe with meanings 
of Europe that were situated far beyond the canonised Western concepts of 
pragmatic political integration. Central European politicians and political essayists 
discussed a canon of cultural and religious European values and the role of the 
nations in the European Union. 
Research on the contemporary history of Central Europe brings light into the 
traditions and the development of Central European meanings of Europe. Before 
1989 and East of the “Iron curtain”, Europe rather served as a place of desire than as 
a concrete concept, a mechanism of integration or an institutional framework. The 
cases of Poland and the Czech Republic (respectively the former Czechoslovakia) 
show that the salient feature of their meanings of Europe in history is the high 
significance of the nation. In the Eastern bloc, Europe was construed along terms of 
culture and civilisation. Party officials, dissidents and journalists framed Europe 
nationally. Regarding ideas of integration, 1989 stands for continuity in Central 
European meanings of Europe. 
The historical East-West difference in the „thinking of Europe“ and former mappings 
of Europe in the new member countries re-shape the present new European Union. 
Exclusive meanings of Europe in Central Europe challenge policies of integration, 
migration, citizenship and governance. There is a drift towards demarcating a 
European self and towards defining a collective in cultural terms. This trend 
strengthens the paradigm of neighbourhood vis-à-vis transnationalisation and 
unification in the E.U. In the debates on the foreign relations of the Union, exponents 
of a cultural European identity address questions of self-demarcation and self-
delimitation. 
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In the negotiations of the future of the European Union, the new member states surprised the 
“old” Europe with unexpected views. The meanings of Europe that their representatives put 
forth in the discussions on a European constitution were situated far beyond the canonised 
Western concepts of pragmatic political integration in Europe with both supranational and 
intergovernmental procedures. Behind the surface of a struggle for influence in the European 
Union, Central European politicians and political essayists debated a European identity and 
how it shall look like. They discussed a canon of cultural and religious European values and 
the role of the nations in the European Union. The course of the negotiations in the E.U. made 
obvious that in the preparations of the eastward enlargement, peculiar Central European ideas 
and traditions of integration had been neglected. To elaborate on this issue, I suggest to look 
into the contemporary history of Central Europe and to analyse how the societies of the 
today’s new member states perceived their neighbours. How did they define their “self” 
against the several “others”? What were the uses of “culture” and “the nation” in these 
debates? What did the Central European nations share with the West, and what separated 
them from it? 
 
East of the “Iron curtain”, the perception of Western European integration remained vague. 
“Europe” rather served as a place of desire than as a concrete concept, a mechanism of 
integration or an institutional framework. After the breakdown of communist rule in 1989, the 
former societies of the Eastern Bloc wanted to “return to Europe”. In search of applicable 
models of politics and economy, they re-oriented westwards. However, they considered their 
own idea of Europe and of a Western civilisation the destination of their return. Different 
regional and national traditions and the resulting divergent ideas of integration took their toll. 
After 20 years of transition it becomes clear that Central Europe’s post-communist political 
landscapes will not merge into the ideal of Western democracy, market economy and supra-
national integration. The attempts of a modernising catch-up did not progress to the Western 
state of the art that the Western European elites expected to be its indisputable end. Despite of 
great efforts of the European Commission, of powerful foundations and of numerous non-
governmental organisations,1 differing political cultures remained in the enlarged East. 
Furthermore, new national delimitations of identity and culture challenged the politics of the 
European Union. Confronted with the approaches of Central European politicians as the 
Kaczyński brothers or Václav Klaus, Western European hopes of convergence and of the 
correction of the 20th century’s errors in Central European history faded away. Furthermore, 
new member states’ politicians opposed the guiding principle of the unification of the 
continent – the continuous deepening of European integration. My evaluation of this field of 
tension stresses the influence of post-communist Central European remembrance. In a 
European context, this perspective examines unconscious dispositions and invented traditions 
in the re-unification of the continent. 
 
Newest research has described how Central European expectations have been confronted with 
Western institutions’ procedures, with Western rituals and Western habits in the years after 
1989. Although the re-unification of the continent is mainly considered as a success story, 
Central European expectations sometimes turned into disillusionment.2 In the other way 
                                                 
1 Cf. the contribution of Laure Delcour in this series of working papers. 
2 For the political level, cf. Amelie Kutter and Vera Trappmann, eds., Das Erbe des Beitritts. 
Europäisierung in Mittel- und Osteuropa [The Legacy of the Accession. Europeanisation in 
Central and Eastern Europe] (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006). For everyday life’s expectations of 
the young generation, cf. Henri Vogt, Between Utopia and disillusionment. A narrative of the 
political transformation in Eastern Europe (New York: Berghahn, 2005). 
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round, tensions between Western expectations and Central European traditions of the framing 
of Europe came unexpectedly and are only rarely reflected. However, they mark an important 
factor of the European Union’s enlargement. To explain the legacy of pre-1989 debates about 
Europe for the current integration process, I will analyse Central European’s identifications 
with Europe, their mental framing of the continent and their ideas of political integration. On 
the Polish and the Czechoslovak example I will discuss specific meanings of Europe, starting 
from the communist period. Beyond the “European core”, these colourful representations of 
Europe were remembered and re-activated later. I will oppose the common explanation of the 
year of 1989 as a rupture and a new start. I am asking what has not been overthrown in 1989. 
Which framings of Europe and what attitudes towards integration persisted – consciously or 
unconsciously – in the optimistic awakenings of 1989? 
 
 
National meanings of Europe 
 
For the understanding of European integration, the relationship between ideas of Europe and 
of its nations is a key question. In the 20th century, national identifications were projected on 
“Europe”.3 In its second half, the ongoing integration process relativised the significance of 
national perspectives only in the Western part of the continent. Meanwhile, Central European 
ideas of Europe evolved in arenas of strong national closure.4 Generally, identifying with 
Europe does not necessarily eliminate national perceptions and perspectives. A European 
public sphere is in the making,5 but even here the main topics and arguments are the result of 
debates on the national or regional levels. Mostly in a second step, they come up Europe-
wide. However, for the late years of state socialism in Central Europe this finding is much 
more relevant. Even in the cross-national network of the Central European dissent, political 
thought and the reflected transnational options based on nationally shaped problem 
awareness. “Polish”, “Czech”, or “German” questions have been projected on Europe. In 
many Central European debates, reframing Europe means reframing the nation. For instance, 
ideas of “Europe” of the post-1989 Czech political elites can be understood as Czech designs, 
and Czech Europeanism derived from Czech self-delimitation and self-evaluation.6 The 
national paradigm remained the foundation of a European thinking in Poland as well.7 Even if 
self-perceptions exceeded the level of the nation states, a national perspective remained. The 
will to negotiate politics, identity and culture in a European context developed in the available 
early-stage-fora of the nations. 
 
                                                 
3 Bo Stråth, "Introduction: Europe as a Discourse," in Europe and the other and Europe as the other, 
ed. Bo Stråth (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2000). 
4 Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Stråth, eds., The meaning of Europe. Variety and contention within and 
among nations (Oxford: Berg, 2002). 
5 Cf. Hartmut Kaelble, "European Self-Understanding in the 20th Century," in Reflections on Multiple 
modernities. European, Chinese and other interpretations, ed. Dominic Sachsenmaier, Jens 
Reidel, and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (Leiden: 2002). 
6 Vladimír Macura, "Sémiotika Evropy [The semiotics of Europe]," in Evropa očima Čechů [Europe 
through the eyes of the Czechs], ed. Eva Hahnová (Praha: Nakladatelství Franze Kafky, 1997). 
7 Claudia Kraft and Katrin Steffen, eds., Europas Platz in Polen. Polnische Europa-Konzeptionen vom 
Mittelalter bis zum EU-Beitritt [Europe's place in Poland. Polish Concepts of Europe from the 
Middle Ages to E.U. Accession] (Osnabrück: fibre, 2007), Thomas Lane and Marian Wolański, 
eds., Poland and European Unity. Ideas and Reality (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Wrocławskiego, 2007). 
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The division of Europe in an Eastern and Western bloc from 1949 to 1989 created not only 
separate geopolitical spheres but also different cultural and mental dispositions. National 
meanings of Europe and attitudes towards integration vary between both sides of the former 
“Iron Curtain”. Central European ideas of Europe rather arose from specific regional 
traditions and experiences than from pan-European debates about integration. While in the 
West of the continent meanings of Europe were predominantly defined in political terms, 
Central Europeans defined their Europe culturally, as “Central Europe” itself was defined in 
terms of culture. Consequently, the western European integration process is a result of 
political pragmatism, while the Central European “dream of Europe” arose from the desire of 
belonging to a western culture. The logics of belonging – inclusion and exclusion – have 
created and strengthened cultural identities and national assignments east of the Iron Curtain. 
Both communist party elites and underground writers propagated and debated them in the 
national arenas of the Western countries of the socialist bloc. 
 
 
Europe in the communist propaganda 
 
Striving for legitimacy, even the Communist parties developed their own meaning of Europe. 
In the first decades after the end of World War II, they rejected the Western European claim 
to represent Europe and stated that the major part of the geographical Europe was now 
socialist. They made progress and peace the leading narratives of their idea of Europe. A 
revision of the communist capture of Central Europe was their greatest fear. Thus, security 
issues shaped their idea of Europe. Their slogan of a “peaceful coexistence” should guarantee 
the persistence of state socialist rule. It was invented in 1975 at the “Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe” (CSCE), when the European and North American governments 
met in Helsinki. Campaigns in the official press were ought to disseminate propaganda of 
peace and security throughout the societies. Narratives of progress, of an East-West dialogue 
and of mutual economic cooperation were prominently featured in the official sphere during 
the détente. At the same time, the centralised propaganda disseminated the so-called 
“dialectics of national consciousness and internationalism” which meant that international 
solidarity was to be accompanied by the national consciousness of its actors. In national 
communism, party officials incorporated nationalism into their ideology.8
 
Official writers of state socialism debated European culture. I will exemplify this on the 
Polish weekly “Polityka” and the Czechoslovak “Tvorba”. Both were political magazines 
with a focus on culture. They covered events of world politics and cultural life. These papers 
were not the central propaganda instruments of the Communist parties. Nevertheless, they 
were subordinated to their strict control. This included the placement of ideology on their 
pages. The “dialectics of national consciousness and internationalism” were part of this 
ideology – patriotism was told to be the necessary precondition for inter-national exchange. 
While “Tvorba” mostly followed this scheme,9 “Polityka” emancipated from the propaganda 
with the idea of an “open patriotism” that favoured cross-border exchange and comparative 
                                                 
8 Cf. Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Understanding national stalinism," Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 32 (1999), Krzysztof Tyszka, Nacjonalizm w komunizmie. Ideologia narodowa w Związku 
Radzieckim i Polsce Ludowej [Nationalism in Communism. National Ideology in the Soviet 
Union and in Poland] (Warszawa: IFIS PAN, 2004). 
9 G.M. Svirin and R. Reiner, "Internacionalismus a národní hrdost v etapě rozvinutého socialismu 
[Internationalism and national pride in developed socialism]," Tvorba, 8.10.1980. 
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perspectives.10 In these papers’ representations of Europe, propaganda of cooperation 
between East and West prevailed in the first half of the 1980s. This official party-controlled 
cooperation covered the high politics, security questions and economic issues. It accompanied 
the efforts of the Communist parties to find agreements with the Western European 
governments in order to legitimate and stabilise their rule. However, this kind of cooperation 
was heavily criticised in the civil rights’ movements as well as by the Western governments. 
To refute this critique, the official propaganda added “culture” to the catalogue of 
cooperation, even though the debate on European culture had been the paradigmatic 
programme of famous independent magazines, as for instance in the Polish exile magazine 
“Kultura” or, in the underground, “Kultura niezależna“. 
 
In the Polish “Polityka”, an article on “The three perspectives on Europe” made a common 
European culture the third perspective. The author Bogdan Suchodolski, a professor of 
pedagogy, pledged for the integrating power of arts and of common European values between 
East and West. Nevertheless, he heavily polemised against the “limited comprehension of 
Central Europe”. In the exile’s and underground’s discussions about “Central Europe”, he saw 
the “suicide of Europe”.11 One year later, a former CSCE delegation leader wrote in the 
Czechoslovak “Tvorba” about the Cultural Forum of Budapest, a CSCE follow-up meeting. 
He reduced the relevance of the meeting to security issues and understood cultural exchange 
only as an instrument of stabilizing the official cooperation procedures between the national 
states. He criticised the parallel meeting of Susan Sontag, György Konrád, Pavel Kohout and 
other independent intellectuals as an “Anti-Forum of private persons” who would “hide 
political ambitions behind a pretended cultural interest”.12 Another year later, “Tvorba” 
discussed European culture at the occasion of the Venice meeting of the “Days of the 
European Nations and Countries”. The author reflected national roots of European culture and 
philosophic conceptions that he considered European, as for instance humanism and the idea 
of a civilisation that is situated at the crossroads of cultural development and technological 
progress.13 These texts are typical communist Euro-propaganda with construed dichotomies, 
patronising rhetoric and artificial simplicity. In the communist propaganda, “culture” and “the 
nation” are tightly interweaved and projected onto a European context. 
 
 
The underground’s and dissent’s Europe 
 
In Central European pre-1989 societies, Europe and the West were perceived as “the other” 
that was separated from the Polish or Czechoslovak everyday life by an insurmountable gap. 
This is why dissidents addressed a belonging of the Central European nations to a “European” 
culture and civilisation. In the “real existing socialism” of the Eastern bloc, the appropriated 
western notions of freedom, human rights and democracy had a utopian pretension. 
Intellectuals of Central and Eastern Europe re-negotiated their self-understandings in the 
debate about a “Central Europe” in these terms. Independent peace activists anticipated the 
end of Europe’s bloc separation and fought the official propaganda of a “peaceful co-
                                                 
10 Interview with the „Polityka“ editor Adam Krzemiński, Jan 10th, 2006. 
11 Bogdan Suchodolski, "Trzy spojrzenia na Europę [Three perspectives on Europe]," Polityka, 
11.8.1984. 
12 Ilja Hulinský, "Zamyšlení nad budapešťským kulturním fórem [Reflections on the Budapest Forum 
of Culture]," Tvorba, 18.12.1985. 
13 Ladislav Gawlik, "Benátské zrcadlo evropské kultury [The Venice Mirror of European Culture]," 
Tvorba, 15.10.1986. 
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existence of East and West”. They claimed citizen’s rights and civil participation.14 In the 
attempts to overcome the bloc division of the continent “from below”, political and cultural 
aspirations were interwoven. 
 
The Czech “Charter 77” referred to the officially acknowledged principles of the CSCE Final 
Act and called for human rights’ guarantees that were fixed in Helsinki as well. However, 
Czech dissent writers like Jiří Dienstbier and Jiří Hájek were sceptical because of the official 
character of the CSCE process. They wanted to transform negotiations between the 
governments into debates between people. In 1986, the peace movements in Western and 
Eastern Europe gave an example of trans-national discussion on a common platform. Its title 
was “Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords”, and it criticised the CSCE follow-up 
conference in 1986 in Vienna for neglecting non-governmental commitment. Its subscribers 
from East and West pledged for “a peace constitution for Europe that is based on the right of 
self-determination for all nations”.15 The document manifested a citizen’s counter-model to 
the protracting negotiations between the governments’ representatives in the CSCE. 
Meanwhile, reform-oriented communists and Marxist dissidents perceived Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s “Common European House” as a chance for a rapprochement of the European 
nations in East and West with a renewed socialism in the East.  
 
Representations of Europe in the underground press often refer to self-determination in a 
“Europe of the nations”. Dissidents and underground writers stressed the cultural foundations 
of the Central European nations under the sign of Europe.16 They claimed their cultures, in 
their essence, “belonged to Europe”. They created “Central Europe” as a pre-stage of the 
return into a Europe of several cultures. This construction opposed the western prescription of 
being “East European”. The Czech exile writer Milan Kundera argued, the Soviets had 
kidnapped Central Europe that culturally belongs to the West of the continent.17  
 
However, the debate about “Central Europe” aimed only at a loose political integration, what 
becomes apparent in the cultures of remembrance of the underground circles. Those who 
debated “Central Europe” referred to interwar concepts of federations in Eastern Central 
Europe that were not federalist in the sense of creating new powerful institutions above the 
nation. For instance, the “Intermarium” (Międzymorze) was mainly debated in the Second 
Polish Republic of 1918-1939 – in the society that was considered to be its leading nation. 
The neighbours referred to it only reluctantly. The creators of federalist ideas in the interwar 
period had not envisaged the handing-over of sovereignty to supranational institutions. In his 
book „The New Europe“, the Czech president Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk stated, a „federation 
of nations“ could only arise if the nations were free and unified on their own. His idea of a 
                                                 
14 Cf. Harold Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human rights in Czechoslovakia (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1981). 
15 Europäisches Netzwerk für den Ost-West-Dialog, ed., Das Helsinki-Abkommen mit wirklichem 
Leben erfüllen (1986) [Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords] (Berlin: 1987). 
16 Michał Buchowski, "Od "Mitteleuropy" do Europy środkowej: Zarys dziejów idei [From 
"Mitteleuropa" to Central Europe. A sketch in the history of ideas]," Sprawy narodowościowe, no. 
19 (2001), Miloš Havelka and Ladislav Cabada, eds., Západní, východní a střední Evropa jako 
kulturní a politické pojmy [Western, Eastern, and Central Europe as Cultural and Political Terms] 
(Plzeň: Západočeská univerzita, 2000), Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, "Mental Maps. Die 
Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der Aufklärung. Literaturbericht 
[Mental Maps. The Construction of Geographical Spaces in Europe since the Enlightenment. A 
Survey on Literature]," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28, no. 3 (2002). 
17 Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," The New York Review of Books, 26.4.1986. 
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synthesis of the national politics and cultures was rather vague.18 In the „New Europe“, ideas 
of integration did not transcend the nation. They were negotiated in and between the nation 
states, presupposing that the existing inner power relations shall persist. The expected result 
was a higher weight of the small Central European nations against their German and Soviet 
opponents.19 Their objective was external strength, not inner integration. Thus, the notions of 
a confederation or an alliance fit the loose Central European „federations“ better than the 
terminology of the sources.20
 
The Central-Europeanism of the 1980’s was interconnected with national ideas of 
“Polishness” or “Czechness”.21 Polish narratives of European Christianity and of the Eastern 
border as the “antemurale christianitatis” stressed a Polish defense of Europe against 
“barbarian” attacks.22 Europe was defined against the East.23 A distinction from the West was 
not addressed as clear as from the East, but existed in the thinking of the “centre” of Europe 
as well. Some advocates of “Central Europe” even identified a Western loss of identity and 
culture. Only in the centre of Europe, that was the assertion of the Central Europeanists, they 
had been preserved.24 Not only “Central Europe”, but even the greater Europe has been 
delimited against both East and West. The Polish underground intellectual Aleksander Hall 
saw European culture threatened by Soviet and American domination.25 In Central Europe, 
culture was not only fundamental in the framing of Europe, but also in the strife for national 
self-determination. The Polish underground writer and later editor of “Radio Free Europe” 
Zdzisław Najder wrote in 1979, „as long as we do not achieve an independent national 
existence, our aspirations shall be focused on the sphere of thought and of cultural 
creativity“.26 The dissidents’ thinking of a „European culture“ practised resistance against 
domination from circles outside the own culture and the own collective.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Nová Evropa. Stanovisko slovanské [The New Europe. The Slav 
standpoint] (Praha: Dubský, 1920), 88, 145. 
19 Janusz Korwin-Mikke, "The Middle Europe," in Myśli o naszej Europie [Thinking about our 
Europe], ed. Redakcja Obozu (Wrocław: Profil, 1988). 
20 An overview on several regional understandings of federalism is given in Wiesław Bokajło, ed., 
Federalizm. Teoria i koncepcje [Federalism. Theory and Concepts] (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1998). 
21 Mirosław Dymarski and Jerzy Juchnowski, eds., Europa środkowo-wschodnia w polskiej myśli 
politycznej [Central Eastern Europe in the Polish Political Thinking], Acta Universitatis 
Wratislaviensis no 2624. (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2004), Jan 
Křen, Historické proměny češství [Historical metamorphoses of Czechness] (Praha: Karolinum, 
1992). 
22 Małgorzata Morawiec, "„Antemurale christianitatis“. Polen als Vormauer des christlichen Europa 
[„Antemurale christianitatis“. Poland as the bulwark of Christian Europe]," Jahrbuch für 
europäische Geschichte 2 (2001). 
23 For the general context of this distiction cf. Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as Central Europe's 
Constituting Other," East European Politics and Societies 7 (1993). 
24 See, for instance, Leszek Szaruga, "Notatki ze środka Europy [Notes from the Middle of Europe]," 
in Zachód porwany. Eseje i Polemiki [The Kidnapped West. Essays and Polemics] (Wrocław: 
Wydawnictwo oświatowe BIS, 1984). 
25 Aleksander Hall, "Europa, ale jaka? [Europe, but which one?]," Bratniak, no. 19 (1979). 
26 Zdzisław Najder, "Polska i Europa [Poland and Europe]," in Polityka niepodległościowa [Politics of 
Independence], ed. Polskie Porozumienie Niepodległościowe / PPN (Warszawa 1983: 1979). 
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Broad acceptance of the nation’s significance in Europe 
 
In the years before the collapse of communism, the official press competed with the 
underground. The oppositions and the party elites led a dialogical struggle about the meaning 
of Europe. Dissidents and underground writers referred to the official CSCE propaganda, 
because they wanted to be legal. The official media adapted underground’s narratives of 
European culture, because they wanted to attract readers. The oppositions appealed to Europe 
to mobilise for a national self-determination from below, the communist elites invocated a 
Europe of peace and claimed to preserve national interests. A struggle was set off about 
whose idea of Europe drew a more promising image of the future and about who presents the 
nation best against a European background. The quest for the most attractive slogans let 
communist narratives of Europe amalgamate with more and more popular, but hidden 
underground narratives. In this struggle, the texts became ambivalent. Furthermore, in this 
exchange a broad debate about Europe was shaped that reached many recipients in several 
spheres of state socialism. Its common denominator was the high significance of the nation in 
Europe.27
 
In the decline of communist rule, the media reformulated the official propaganda. The 
editorial staff interpreted the guidelines of press control more loose. Even if their texts had to 
refer to officially accepted narratives, they sometimes went far beyond the official 
interpretation. New meaning was produced. In the Polish “Polityka”, the limits of discourse 
were wide. The paper described the Cultural Forum of Budapest as an opening of Hungary 
towards the West. The author mentioned Siemens translation equipment, praised the 
conference buildings and stated that they were built by Austrians. He openly stressed severe 
conflicts between Eastern and Western understandings of “culture”. Finally, he took the 
opportunity to present his own understanding of European culture and proposed Christianity, 
Roman law, Greek aesthetics and humanist ideals.28 This is a mixture of underground and 
official narratives of European culture. 
 
The dissidents’ scepticism towards the lagging CSCE process entered the official arena as 
well. In 1987, the „Tvorba“ journalist Milan Syruček reported from the Vienna CSCE follow 
up conference under the title „Progress or a dancing step?”29 He described the Vienna 
happenings more as a gala than as a goal-oriented conference and asked, whether Vienna 
could catch up with the contemporary dynamics of world politics.30 Nevertheless, he made 
concessions to the official propaganda and held the U.S. delegation responsible for the 
delayed CSCE process. Excluding Northern America, he argued, a “European culture of 
solidarity” could be the basis of a “new philosophy of Europe”.31 The “Tvorba” articles of 
Milan Syruček illustrate the coexistence of both official and independent narratives of Europe 
                                                 
27 In times of crisis, public discourses contract around key topics. Cf. Kurt Imhof, "Öffentlichkeit und 
Identität [The Public Sphere and Identity]," in Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 
20. Jahrhundert [Transnational Public Spheres and Identities in the 20th Century], ed. Hartmut 
Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2002). 
28 Zdzisław Pietrasik, "Europa kulturalna [The Cultural Europe]," Polityka, 26.10.1985. 
29 Milan Syruček, "Vídeň: Taneční krok, či pokrok? [Progress, or a dancing step?]," Tvorba, 
2.12.1987. The Czech „pokrok“ allows a play with words, it means „progress“ but includes 
„step“. In an interview of June 16th, 2006, Syruček stated to have constant exchange with 
Czechoslovak dissidents. 
30 Milan Syruček, "Stačí Vídeň tempu doby? [Can Vienna keep up with our era's developments?]," 
Tvorba, 3.8.1988. 
31 Milan Syruček, "Nový evropský horizont [The New European Horizon]," Tvorba, 1.2.1989. 
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in the official state socialist discourse about Europe. The condemning and the exclusion of the 
United States of America was the last remnant of the official propaganda here. 
 
In the last years of state socialism, the limits of discourse widened. “Polityka” published texts 
that stressed Western Europe as the positive “other”. The “Polityka” author Krzysztof Teodor 
Toeplitz wrote in 1987 about a Polish need to “Return to Europe” and stated, in the anti-
semitic campaigns of 1968 Europeanness got lost in the country. Now, Poles would not 
possess the comprehensions, ideas and experiences that were needed to understand 
contemporary Europe.32 While Toeplitz sketched a way to Europe rather vaguely, the 
“Polityka” essayist Adam Krzemiński did not hesitate to mark the road. His essay „A Cobweb 
in the Centre of Europe” mapped historical and present connections between East and West. 
Krzemiński argued these micro-references formed a network that makes up Central Europe.33 
One year later, the famous essay “My dream of Central Europe” of the Hungarian dissident 
György Konrád was printed in “Polityka”. It proposed a third way between East and West.34 
Though it still differed from Milan Kundera’s text about the “kidnapped West”, the official 
publication of texts about “Central Europe” was revolutionary for state socialism. In Poland, 
even the old narrative of the “peaceful coexistence” of East and West was openly criticised, 
for instance by the Polish ambassador in France and former journalist Janusz Stefanowicz.35 
The debate about European culture continued and was enriched by Gorbachev’s conception of 
a “Common European house”.36 The Czechoslovak “Tvorba” drew lines across the bloc 
border as well, but later. In March 1989, Milan Syruček wrote, Czechoslovakia was in the 
“heart of Europe”. Its position at the axes of European politics, economy, culture and 
humanity qualified it for leading an East-West dialogue.37 Few months later, the Communist 
party’s “Rudé Právo” argued in the same way on its title page.38
  
Long before the breakdown of communist rule, new forms emerged in the discourse about 
Europe and new meaning was produced. Though not mentioned explicitly, the narrators of 
civic ideas of Europe “from below” spread meaning out to the official public of state 
socialism. In the struggle for power, invocations of “Central Europe” and of a “Return to 
Europe” amalgamated with official narratives. The debate on a “common European culture” 
altered from supporting the official “peaceful coexistence” towards negotiating the future of 
the continent. Thus, underground narratives had entered a broad and public debate. 
Underground and official writers created common dispositions of Europe in Central Europe’s 
societies. Central Europeans faced Europe and discussed their nation’s role in it. In Poland, 
thinking about Europe had been possible long before 1989. In Czechoslovakia the turn 
proceeded in the year of 1989. Here, until the last months of communism ambivalence and 
hybridity persisted in the official press. When the official state socialist press became 
                                                 
32 KTT, "Powrót do Europy? [A Return to Europe?]," Polityka, 14.2.1987. 
33 Adam Krzemiński, "Pajęczyna w środku Europy [A Cobweb in the Middle of Europe]," Polityka, 
3.1.1987. 
34 György Konrád, "Sen o Europie Środkowej [The Dream of Central Europe]," Polityka, 12.11.1988. 
35 Janusz Stefanowicz, "Wspólistnienie: Dogmat częściowo nieświeży [Coexistence: A Partly 
Outdated Dogma]," Polityka, 17.9.1988. 
36 Zbigniew Czeczot-Gawrak, "Długi most Europy [The Long Bridge of Europe]," Polityka, 
26.11.1988, Anna Wolff-Powęska, "Głód Europy. Przed przeprowadzką do wspólnego domu 
[Hunger for Europe. Before Moving into the Common House]," Polityka, 1.4.1989. 
37 Milan Syruček, "Naše místo ve světě [Our Place in the World]," Tvorba, 29.3.1989. In a book that 
has been written for a more limited public, he claimed this already in 1977: Milan Syruček, 
Evropa zítřka [Tomorrow's Europe] (Praha: Práce, 1977), 10. 
38 "Náš zájem v Evropě [Our Interest in Europe]," Rudé právo, 19.8.1989. 
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undermined by underground narratives, these entered a broad, but nationally framed public. In 
difference to some transnationalising circles of the dissent, the attention towards the 
neighbouring countries remained cautious in the official public. 
 
1989 as rupture and continuity 
 
In 1989, the systems of rule and the limits of discourse suddenly changed in Central Europe. 
The former dissent’s narratives of Europe were now discussed in an open public. Their 
identity politics formed meanings of Europe in new power relations. While social indicators 
such as consumption, travelling, and migration point at a tremendous transnationalisation of 
the Central European societies after 1989, a specific Central European framing of Europe 
persisted. The consensus on the importance of the nation in Europe remained beyond doubt. 
In the “return to Europe” it was often unconscious and only sometimes debated. The Central 
European re-framing of Europe started long before 1989. Here, 1989 does not represent a 
sudden rupture, but rather a turning point. Narratives of Europe were constantly – and are still 
being – realigned. 
 
While 1989 is often understood as the beginning of a Europhoria in Central Europe, earlier 
discourses anticipated the end of bloc separation well before 1989. The key topics of the 
debates after 1989 originate in these earlier discourses. Because official and independent ideas 
had shaped the meanings of Europe long before a membership in the European Union was 
possible, the Western Europe remained as ‚the other’. Central European national sites of 
remembrance, which were shaped by the dissidents or even by the Communist parties before 
1989, remained. After 1989, identity politics stressed their European dimension. The 
Czechoslovak remembrance of the Munich agreement of 1938 was heavily exploited by the 
communists and remained in the collective memory of today’s Czech society. Underground 
activists of Peoples’ Poland criticised the treaty of Yalta for installing Soviet domination over 
their country, and so do Polish intellectuals today. Both sites of remembrance invocate 
Europe and point at the political geography of the continent. The communist elites understood 
the cooperation of the CSCE in national contributions to the security of Europe. After the end 
of the communist era, the new politicians saw the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) as a guarantee of the „European postwar order“ and of the postwar national 
borders. The former dissident and Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs Jiří Dienstbier 
pledged for a permanent European Security Commission in Prague in 1990 and 1992. Before 
1989, the oppositions and the state socialist governments struggled for power in national 
arenas, and national historical consciousness pre-formed the “return to Europe”.39 
Traditionally, several Polish and Czech intellectuals perceived supranational conceptions as a 
threat to national self-determination. Debates about European cultural unity and diversity 
were led in the whole 20th century’s Central Europe, and national contributions to European 
culture were stressed. The invocation of Europe legitimised national policies and described 
national or regional culture as European. In the middle of a tremendous change, the set of 
Central European meanings of Europe persisted. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Cf. Jiří Vykoukal, ed., Visegrád. Možnosti a meze středoevropské spolupráce [Visegrád. 
Possibilities and Limits of Central European Cooperation] (Praha: Dokořán, 2003). 
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Central European meanings of Europe and European integration 
 
Activities of Central European pressure groups for the rapprochement of Europe are rooted in 
pre-1989 commitments. Polish Catholics and peace activists created the foundation “Poland in 
Europe” to continue debates of the church-initiated colloquium “Central Europe”40 and of the 
independent group “Wolność i pokój” (Peace and Freedom).41 Czech dissidents and reformist 
Marxists had written about the overcoming of Europe’s bloc separation since the early 1980’s. 
They founded the journal “Mezinárodní politika” (Foreign affairs) to spread these debates in a 
broader public, focusing on the principles of integration in Europe. 
 
After the breakdown of communism, the pre-1989 meanings of Europe encountered the 
context and the normative pretensions of E.U. integration. In Central Europe, the enlargement 
process stimulated debates about supranationality, cosmopolitanism, federalism and the 
nation. In advance of the European Union’s enlargement, Western transfers were focused on 
the E.U. accession of Central Europe’s states. In their confrontation with Central European 
framings of Europe, hybrid meanings of the future shape of the continent arose. A field of 
tension between regionalism and integrationism emerged. Western and Central European 
integrationists debated narratives and slogans that had been successful in the western part of 
the continent already. In contrast, regionalists referred to Central European traditions. 
Intermingling these two tendencies, many political essayists with a focus on European 
unification maintained an active participation of the new member states in the European 
Union’s decision making processes. They claimed the institutional conditions for a strong 
influence in the E.U. what revealed, for instance, the Polish adherence to the Treaty of Nice.42 
Because Central European public intellectuals led these debates in historical terms, traditional 
national and regional meanings of Europe formed the contemporary collective memory and 
the attitudes towards integration. History and tradition became policy-relevant. 
 
In the West of the continent, „Europe“ was mostly understood as an instrument of the 
institutional limitation of the nation, if not for its overcoming. Federalist thinking was a part 
of political cultures both in domestic politics and in foreign relations.43 Here, a domestic 
demand for integration was the impetus for a European supra-nationality.44 However, Central 
Europeans saw federalism as an instrument of strengthening the nation’s influence in the 
international arena. Even popular “federal” ideas of the interwar period did not promote the 
delegation of sovereignty to supra-national institutions. The Central Europеan federalisms are 
„interstate federalisms“.45 In domestic politics, federalism was refused because here it was 
                                                 
40 Konwersatorium „Polska w Europie“, ed., Europa Środkowa [Central Europe], 2 vols., Studium 
Kultury Chrześcijańskiej (Warszawa: Kościół pod wezwaniem Świętej Trójcy w Warszawie, 
1988). 
41  Pokój Międzynarodowy i Porozumienie Helsińskie. Ramowy Program Seminarium 
organizowanego przez ruch "Wolność i Pokój" w dniach 7., 8., 9. maja 1987 w Warszawie 
[International Peace and the Helsinki agreement. Programme of the seminar, organized by the 
Movement "Freedom and Peace"], Biuletyn WiP (1987). 
42 Cf. Marek Cichocki, Porwanie Europy [The Kidnapping of Europe] (Kraków, Warszawa: OMP 
CSM, 2004). 
43 Michael Burgess, Federalism and European Union. The building of Europe, 1950-2000 (London: 
Routledge, 2000). 
44 Cf. Andrew Moravcsik, The choice for Europe. Social purpose and state power from Messina to 
Maastricht, Cornell studies in political economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
45 Vojtech Mastny, "The Historical Experience of Federalism in East Central Europe," East European 
Politics and Societies 14, no. 1 (2000). 
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seen as a threat to national sovereignty. Consequently, policies that reach beyond the own 
nation will not be understood as „domestic“. 
 
In Central Europe, there is no tradition of multi-level governance that combines both 
supranational and intergovernmental approaches to integration. However, integration only 
succeeds if the vision of its desired political order resonates with former ideas that developed 
inside the involved nations.46 In Central Europe, there is not the congruence between 
„Europe“ and the nation state as Alan Milward described it for the West European EC 
members that, in his opinion, pursued a „European rescue of the nation state“.47 This makes 
up the missing link between Central European ideas of – mostly national – statehood and the 
supranational dimension of European integration. Thus, the „unusual new polity“48 of the 
European Union and the singularity of its formation finds itself beyond the historically grown 
patterns of Central European political cultures. 
 
This opposition did not only emerge in the politics of European integration. Research on the 
re-unification of Europe after 1989 shows congruent patterns. On the one hand, Western-
initiated transition research focuses on the convergence of Central Europe towards the West 
in democratisation and marketisation processes. A broad range of literature has been 
published that measured the progress of the accession candidates towards the desired ideal in 
many fields. On the other hand, Central European research on political ideas points at the 
possible contribution of regional Europeanisms to European integration.49 Central European 
historians stress the Europeanism of symbolic national and religious leaders.50 The traditions 
of such Central European Europeanisms are mostly seen in the interwar period. Admittedly, 
both tendencies intermingled, and the dichotomy of “Western” or “Central European” origins 
of implicit norms changed into a co-existence of integrationist and regionalist approaches. 
 
However, the described dividing line between East and West is blurred. In the historical 
perspective, pro-national Europeanisms appeared in the West of the continent as well. They 
                                                 
46 Martin Marcussen et al., "Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation 
state identities," Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999). 
47 Even if Milward strongly opposes the explanations of Burgess and Gilbert as „myths, nurtured by 
federalists“, both interpretations have the strong link between Europe and the nations in common: 
Alan S. Milward, The European rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992), 119. 
48 Mark Gilbert, Surpassing realism. The politics of European integration since 1945 (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
49 Ivan M. Havel and Dušan Třeštík, eds., Co daly naše země Evropě a lidstvu. Část 3: Svobodný 
národ na prahu třetího tisíciletí [What our Bohemian Countries gave to Europe and to Mankind. 
Part three: The Free Nation at the Threshold of the Third Millennium] (Praha: Evropský literární 
klub, 2000), Lane and Wolański, eds., Poland and European Unity. Ideas and Reality, František 
Mezihorák, Evropanství a integrace [Europeanism and Integration] (Olomouc: Nakladatelství 
Olomouc, 2003). 
50 Vladimír Goněc, Za sjednocenou Evropu. Z myšlenek a programů Huberta Ripky [For a United 
Europe. Thoughts and Programs of Hubert Ripka] (Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2004), 
Stanislava Kučerová, ed., Českoslovenství, středoevropanství, evropanství 1918-1998. Úvahy, 
svědectví a fakta [Czechoslovakness, Central Europeanness, and Europeanness 1918-1998. 
Deliberation, Testimony, and Facts] (Brno: Konvoj, 1998), Sławomir Sowiński and Radosław 
Zenderowski, Europa drogą Kościoła. Jan Paweł II o Europie i europejskości [Europe in the 
Means of the Church. John Paul II about Europe and Europeanness] (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy 
im. Ossolińskich, 2003), Emil Voráček, ed., T.G. Masaryk, idea demokracie a současné 
evropanství [T.G. Masaryk, Ideas of Democracy and Contemporary Europeanness] (Praha: 
Filosofia, 2001). 
 
 13
mobilised for Europe from below, while anti-national Europeanisms advocated a construction 
of Europe „from the top“.51 The case of Giuseppe Mazzini and the Italian risorgimento under 
the sign of Europe showed ambivalences of a pro-national European republicanism, such as 
the missing rejection of aggressive nationalism or the strong rootedness in national logics.52 
Even for the second half of the 20th century, the distinction between pro-national 
Europeanisms in the former East and a tendency towards supranationality in the former West 
is blurred. For the early postwar period, the „Europe of the nations“ of Charles de Gaulle 
retained intergovernmentalism and challenged the integration process.53 This French 
dissonance between the nation and European integration was soon overcome. Nevertheless, 
there are national biases in the non-Eastern periphery of the EC as well, for instance, in Great 
Britain. And, at last, the political struggle in the national arenas can lead to 
intergovernmentalist predominance as it happened in Denmark. However, in the late Western 
cases the role of historical experience and of invented traditions is not as significant as in 
Central Europe. 
 
European political debates about the future of the European Union reveal rare attention to 
regional traditions and hidden meanings of Europe in the new member countries. Negotiations 
are led in various group constellations under the conditions of day-to-day politics. The 
conflicting positions correspond with national traditions of thinking about Europe, but these 
are not always reflected. There is few sensitivity for regional peculiarities and national 
meanings of Europe beyond the own background. These circumstances make Central 
European framings of Europe a demanding legacy for the European integration. Managing 
diversity and assuring integration becomes more challenging. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Central European discourses about Europe before 1989 do not only explain the public protest 
that led to the dismantling of the Eastern Bloc. Knowing more about them helps to understand 
contemporary representations of Europe. The breakdown of Europe’s dividing line has not 
been accomplished by a consensus on the meaning of post-1989 Europe yet. After the 
enlargement, the controversy about the nation’s place in Europe recaptured its significance. 
While narratives of cosmopolitan and multi-level European identities dominate in the western 
states of the European Union, there is a strong presence of regional and national – and often 
exclusive – Europeanisms in the new member countries of the European Union. Politicians of 
Central Europe exploited fear of integration54 and reluctance towards the adaptation of 
                                                 
51 Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, "European Nationalism and European Union," in The Idea of Europe. 
From antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden, Woodrow Wilson Center series 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Because the author’s concept of the construction 
of identity and community refers to Ernest Gellner, she uses the term of „European nationalism“ 
instead of Europeanism. 
52 Ibid., 182, 83. 
53 Cf. Hans-Dieter Lucas, Europa vom Atlantik bis zum Ural? Europapolitik und Europadenken im 
Frankreich der Ära de Gaulle (1958 - 1969) [Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural? 
European Politics and European Thinking in de Gaulle's France], ed. Deutsches Historisches 
Institut (Bonn, Berlin: Bouvier, 1992). 
54 Václav Klaus, "Vytvořme jinou Evropskou unii [Let's Create an Other European Union]," Lidové 
Noviny, 18.7.2005. 
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Western European values.55 This provoked not only a conflict of objectives between the “old” 
and the “new” member states in their integration policies. Essential and exclusive meanings of 
Europe set up obstacles for further debates about the future shape of the E.U. As a result, the 
European West regarded the new member countries as situated beyond a European “core”. 
However, the deepening of such a gap jeopardises the inner cohesion of the E.U. Instead, 
continuing east-west-debates about the future of Europe supports the development of a 
European public sphere and appreciates regional political cultures.  
 
The relations between the old and new member states are in flux. Therefore it is not possible 
to explore the full consequences of the presented findings with the methods of contemporary 
history. Exclusive Europeanisms in Central Europe have always been challenged by counter-
narratives. The resulting debates are lively and their outcomes are often surprising. 
Furthermore, essentialisms of Europe have traditions in the West of the continent as well. A 
gradual development in the present European political landscape leads away from a pure east-
west dichotomy of national meanings of Europe, as I have described here in a heuristic 
reduction. The linkages of meanings of Europe between the nations and the European level 
are complex.56 They are competing and pluralistic. In Central Europe and in the whole E.U. 
there are shifts between Europhoria and Europhobia as well as between integrationism and 
regionalism. Hence, it is early to estimate the impact of Central European meanings of Europe 
to the E.U. integration as a whole. But undoubtedly, the emergence of exclusive meanings of 
Europe in Central Europe challenges integration, migration, citizenship and governance in the 
present new European Union. It touches crucial common E.U. policies in foreign relations, 
security and law. Though great efforts have been made to transfer Western models to Central 
Europe, regional and national meanings of Europe are dominating Central European debates 
about the political and cultural future shape of continent. This finding poses a challenge for 
the E.U. politics of convergence and cultural integration. 
 
There is a historical difference in integration objectives that generated an East-West 
difference in the „thinking of Europe“ and the considered paths of integration. The legacy of 
former mappings of Europe in the new member countries consists of a lower degree of 
transnationality and of scepticism towards supranational integration. There is a drift towards 
demarcating a European self and towards defining a collective in cultural terms. Central 
European claims of “belonging to Europe” followed this scheme and described the own 
nation as European. What are the consequences of a Europe-wide, intensified projection of 
national identities to a higher level? Which results provoke enhanced practices of negotiating 
European self-understandings in sharply defined collectives? The enlargement brought new 
and often narrow norms into the debate about European self-understandings and about the 
relations of the E.U. to its neighbouring cultures. Paradoxically, in a pluralised Europe of 
“Unity in Diversity”, new Central European essentialisms strengthen the forgotten old ones of 
the E.U. of the fifteen. The variety of national Europeanisms inside the Union blurs the 
finalité of the integration process as well as common international relation’s policies of the 
European Union. Inside the E.U., this trend strengthens the paradigm of neighbourhood vis-à-
vis transnationalisation and unification. In the debates on the foreign relations of the Union, 
                                                 
55 Roman Giertych, "Przemówienie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej w nieformalnym spotkaniu 
ministrów edukacji państw europejskich [Speech of the minister of National Education at the 
informal meeting of the ministers of education of the European states]," (Heidelberg, 1.3.2007, in 
the author’s archive). 
56 Cf. Chebel d'Appollonia, "European Nationalism and European Union." 
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exponents of a homogeneous European identity address questions of self-demarcation and 
self-delimitation. 
 
